Soviet Emigre Organized Crime Networks in the United States, 1992-1995
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The goal of this study was to assess the nature and scope of Soviet emigre crime in the United States, with a special focus on the question of whether and how well this crime was organized. The research project was designed to overcome the lack of reliable and valid knowledge on Soviet emigre crime networks through the systematic collection, evaluation, and analysis of information. In Part 1, the researchers conducted a national survey of 750 law enforcement specialists and prosecutors to get a general overview of Soviet emigre crime in the United States. For Parts 2-14, the researchers wanted to look particularly at the character, operations, and structure, as well as the criminal ventures and enterprises, of Soviet emigre crime networks in the New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania region. They were also interested in any international criminal connections to these networks, especially with the former Soviet Union. The investigators focused particularly on identifying whether these particular networks met the following criteria commonly used to define organized crime: (1) some degree of hierarchical structure within the network, (2) continuity of that structure over time, (3) use of corruption and violence to facilitate and protect criminal activities, (4) internal discipline within the network structure, (5) involvement in multiple criminal enterprises that are carried out with a degree of criminal sophistication, (6) involvement in legitimate businesses, and (7) bonding among participants based upon shared ethnicity. Data for Parts 2-14 were collected from a collaborative effort with the Tri-State Joint Project on Soviet Emigre Organized Crime. From 1992 through 1995 every investigative report or other document produced by the project was entered into a computer file that became the database for the network analysis. Documents included undercover observation and surveillance reports, informant interviews, newspaper articles, telephone records, intelligence files from other law enforcement agencies, indictments, and various materials from the former Soviet Union. Every individual, organization, and other entity mentioned in a document was considered an actor, given a code number, and entered into the database. The investigators then used network analysis to measure ties among individuals and organizations and to examine the structure of the relationships among the entries in the database. In Part 1, National Survey of Law Enforcement and Prosecutors Data, law enforcement officials and prosecutors were asked if their agency had any contact with criminals from the former Soviet Union, the types of criminal activity these people were involved in, whether they thought these suspects were part of a criminal organization, whether this type of crime was a problem for the agency, whether the agency had any contact with governmental agencies in the former Soviet Union, and whether anyone on the staff spoke Russian. Part 2, Actor Identification Data, contains the network identification of each actor coded from the documents in Part 3 and identified in the network data in Parts 4-14. An actor could be an individual, organization, concept, or location. Information in Part 2 includes the unique actor identification number, the type of actor, and whether the actor was a "big player." Part 3, Sources of Data, contains data on the documents that were the sources of the network data in Parts 4-14. Variables include the title and date of document, the type of document, and whether the following dimensions of organized crime were mentioned: sources of capital, locational decisions, advertising, price setting, financial arrangements, recruitment, internal structure, corruption, or overlapping partnerships. Parts 4-14 contain the coding of the ties among actors in particular types of documents, and are named for them: indictments, tips, investigative reports, incident reports, search reports, interview reports, arrest reports, intelligence reports,
Assessing Punitive and Cooperative Strategies of Corporate Crime Control for Select Companies Operating in 1995 Through 2000 [United States]
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The purpose of the study was to evaluate the extent to which deterrence or cooperative strategies motivated firms and their facilities to comply with environmental regulations. The project collected administrative data (secondary data) for a sample of publicly owned, United States companies in the pulp and paper, steel, and oil refining industries from 1995 to 2000 to track each firm's economic, environmental, and enforcement compliance history. Company Economic and Size Data (Part 1) from 1993 to 2000 were gathered from the Standard and Poor's Industrial Compustat, Mergent Online, and Securities and Exchange Commission, resulting in 512 company/year observations. Next, the research team used the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), and the EPA's Permit Compliance System (PCS) to identify all facilities owned by the sample of firms between 1995 and 2000. Researchers then gathered Facility Ownership Data (Part 2), resulting in 15,408 facility/year observations. The research team gathered various types of PCS data from the EPA for facilities in the sample. Permit Compliance System Facility Data (Part 3) were gathered on the 214 unique major National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits issued to facilities in the sample. Although permits were given to facilities, facilities could have one or more discharge points (e.g., pipes) that released polluted water directly into surface waters. Thus, Permit Compliance System Discharge Points (Pipe Layout) Data (Part 4) were also collected on 1,995 pipes. The EPA determined compliance using two methods: inspections and evaluations/assessments. Permit Compliance System Inspections Data (Part 5) were collected on a total of 1,943 inspections. Permit Compliance System Compliance Schedule Data (Part 6) were collected on a total of 3,336 compliance schedule events. Permit Compliance System Compliance Schedule Violation Data (Part 7) were obtained for a total of 246 compliance schedule violations. Permit Compliance System Single Event Violations Data (Part 8) were collected on 75 single event violations. Permit Compliance System Measurement/Effluent and Reporting Violations Data (Part 9) were collected for 396,479 violations. Permit Compliance System Enforcement Actions Data (Part 10) were collected on 1,730 enforcement actions. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Data (Part 11) were collected on a total of 2,243 inspections. The OSHA data were collected by company name and include multiple facilities owned by each company and were not limited to facilities in the Permit Compliance System. Additional information about firm noncompliance was drawn from EPA Docket and CrimDoc systems. Administrative and Judicial Docket Case Data (Part 12) were collected on 40 administrative and civil cases. Administrative and Judicial Docket Case Settlement Data (Part 13) were collected on 36 administrative and civil cases. Criminal Case Data (Part 14) were collected on three criminal cases. For secondary data analysis purposes, the research team created the Yearly Final Report Data (Part 15) and the Quarterly Final Report Data (Part 16). The yearly data contain a total of 378 company/year observations; the quarterly data contain a total of 1,486 company/quarter observations. The research team also conducted a vignette survey of the same set of companies that are in the secondary data to measure compliance and managerial decision-making. Concerning the Vignette Data (Part 17), a factorial survey was developed and administered to company managers tapping into perceptions of the costs and benefits of pro-social and anti-social conduct for themselves and their companies. A total of 114 respondents from 2 of the sampled corporations read and responded to a total of 384 vignettes representing 4 scenario types: technical noncompliance, significant noncompliance, over-compliance, and response to counter-terrorism. Part